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Abstract
This article explores the ways in which memory and humiliation can shape the social engagement
of persistently violent men. Drawing upon field data from two of our previous ethnographic
studies conducted in the North East of England, we hope to make a few basic points about
the importance of emotion and memory as constitutive and dynamic components in the core
of identity. Focusing on the emotional ‘feelings’ of humiliation and regret, we will outline how
violent incidents or verbal challenges from earlier stages of the individual’s life-course can be
drawn upon, both directly and indirectly, as motivational and justificatory instruments in
potentially violent interactions in the here and now. The intention is to propose what might be
important psychosocial elements of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and how an exposition of
these elements might further our understanding of subjective violence.
INTRODUCTION
Most of the fieldwork in this article is drawn from our recent investigation of violence in Britain’s
night-time economy (Winlow and Hall, 2006) and supplemented by data drawn from an earlier
piece of ethnographic research that was primarily concerned with the evolution of professional
entrepreneurial crime as Britain shifted from an industrial to a consumer/service economy
(Winlow, 2001). However, the central theoretical proposal we make in this article has little to
do with the initial goals of these studies. It was only upon revisiting field notes and interview
data that our basic thesis began to take shape. All of the men quoted later were under the age
of 30 when interviews were conducted, all are from the northeast of England and all hail from
what was at the time of their birth unhesitatingly called ‘the working class’, although
identifying their precise class origin is now fraught with difficulty in a world allegedly free
from such archaic and reified structural forms. All are white and live in white-dominated areas,
and all but one have had a long and complicated relationship with physical violence. In the five
years between the two studies the economic realities in which the lives of the post-industrial
working class are embedded changed quite profoundly. These changes are reflected in the
biographies of our interviewees and what they have to say about their position in the world
and their relationships with others.
The initial study (Winlow, 2001) focused on individuals who were, at the time, committed and
relatively successful criminals, but their fortunes have varied quite considerably since the
completion of this piece of research. Some have managed to hold on to the last vestiges of
traditional working-class occupations, others have managed to stay afloat on the perilous seas
of the Britain’s illegitimate economies, and others still have fallen into long-term economic
marginalization, drug use and petty crime. Violence has always been a part of these young men’s
lives, and those who moved into professional crime in their late teens and early twenties often
used violence as a means of maintaining or expanding their share of illegal markets (Winlow,
2001).
The interviews for the second study were conducted between 2004 and 2005 (see Winlow
and Hall, 2006). The interviewees are still in their 20s and they still occupy a cultural landscape
different to that of the men from the earlier study. None of the 2004–5 cohort’s members were
committed criminals; indeed we quite deliberately identified socially included ex-working-
class men and women. Their lives were far less characterized by extreme economic hardship
and its assortment of criminogenic cultural consequences (Winlow and Hall, 2006). In
comparison to the respondents from the earlier study they lived to a large extent more pacified
lives, relatively unaffected by the persistent violence that inevitably accompanies street-level
professional criminality (Hobbs, 1995; Winlow, 2001). Many of the respondents in the 2004–5
cohort worked in highly exploitative occupations in Britain’s burgeoning service sector, but
because they continued to live with parents the truth of their lowly socio-economic position
was masked by the relative affluence and stability of their traditionally ‘working class’
families. The study suggested that transitions into work and adulthood are now fraught
with difficulty and the relatively stable reproductive cultural capital that once accompanied
former class-based identities is now in a state of fragmentation and fl ux. As compensation
for what has been lost, as well as an alternative source of identity, these precariously ‘socially
included’ young people engaged in regular bouts of expensive consumption in the fields of
fashion and leisure despite being trapped in a very poorly paid employment sector. The
cohort was selected primarily on the basis of its members’ involvement in night-time drinking
cultures. Most of the young men were often violent in this specific environment but not
necessarily involved in other forms of crime.
The two groups did, however, have a great deal in common in a broader sociohistorical
sense and in a more fundamental psychosocial sense: we understand ‘psychosocial’ as the
social scientific attempt to understand the subject as an interface between the psychological and
the social (see Frosh, 2003; Gadd and Jefferson, 2007). Stark similarities became apparent
when our male interviewees discussed the role of violence in their lives and their feelings
about their involvement in it. In what follows we will outline a broad theoretical framework
and then present a number of quotes as a means of exploring how these men feel about
physical violence, and the humiliation or renown that often accompany it, before moving on
to propose a psychosocial extension of Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of habitus, in our opinion a
much underused theoretical tool in criminology.
The anthropologist Marcel Mauss (see Levi-Strauss, 1987) is often credited with the modern
adaptation and development of the ancient concept of habitus as a social scientific means
of connecting the individual to the social structure and thus understanding everyday behaviours
in their social contexts. However, it was Pierre Bourdieu who signifi antly expanded the concept
and brought it into the sociological mainstream. For Bourdieu (1986, 1992) the concept
furnishes us with a way of understanding the intergenerational reproductive nature of class
cultures and the complex dispositions and practical logics that seem to guide the everyday
actions and expressions of the individuals who inhabit them. Values, beliefs, opinions, tastes
and social behaviours are the products of neither the rational, calculative agency of each
individual nor the free negotiation of meaning in sub-cultural groups. Nor are they the
products of creative play in the indeterminate realms of existential choice or post-
structural language and subjectivity, and nor can they be fully understood as the products
of the individual’s position as either an interpellated or a naturally resistant/transgressive
subject of ideology and hegemony. Rather, the habitus is a suite of internalized and
embodied dispositions that unconsciously guides social action, structures social attitudes
and reproduces beliefs, values and practices. The enduring appeal of habitus relates to its
ability to capture the mundane, habitual nature of the everyday. It is internalized,
subjectifying and durable in the sense that after its successful internalization the individual does
not necessarily need the constant presence of others to enforce the rules that govern emotional,
expressive and practical life. Habitus captures and reproduces a highly nuanced ‘feel for the
game’ as the actor struggles through specific social and occupational fields, equipping him with a
complex repertoire of responses to everyday life as it unfolds around him. It guides the actor as
he attempts to stay in tune with the social ‘logic of practice’ (Bourdieu, 1990) behind what
otherwise seem to be habitual, unthinking responses to the external world.
Men who carry with them the deeply ingrained visceral dispositions that are the products of
socialization within micro-climates of insecurity, aggression and domination often come to value
violence and place its enactment close to the centre of self-identity (see Hall, 1997; Winlow,
2001; Winlow and Hall, 2006). These dispositions are not simply a product of some mythical,
generic working-class habitus, and of course the notion that mainstream working-class
masculine codes place high value on physical violence is an intellectual error propagated by
the radical feminist and ‘hegemonic masculinity’ discourses (Jefferson, 2002). However, there is
no doubt that in certain circumstances some common but very specific aspects of the masculine
working-class habitus can indeed constitute and reproduce the self-identity of persistently
violent men (see Hall, 1997). For example, in a structurally subordinated position where the
symbolic violence of the dominant elite suffocates expressive life and prevents the
development of a language that can express that subordination (Bourdieu, 1986), the
desire not to be dominated by another can become extremely potent. In the late modern world
structured, institutionalized conflict has been superseded by the myriad forms of fractious
struggle that characterize an atomised, liquid set of social relations (Bauman, 2000, 2001;
Wieviorka, 2009). Here, where the individual’s sense of order and control over the life-course
has diminished, defending personal space and refusing to submit to the authority of external
agents keen to wrestle status, renown and tangible material benefits from the immediate social
environment takes on heightened significance (see Anderson, 2001). For example, generations of
working-class men have been instructed to ‘look after yourself’ and ‘not to take any shit’. These
injunctions were and still are a practical and entirely necessary response to everyday life in a
cultural environment in which threats to the individual’s physical integrity issued by a
minority of persistently violent individuals are an unavoidable part of everyday life (Anderson,
2001; Winlow, 2001). It is not violence itself that is valued but the ability to retain some sense of
dignity and respect in the face of it, and ‘looking after’ oneself and ‘refusing to take shit’ have
become, for some men at least, compelling strategies internalized by the habitus. In most cases
these injunctions are understood to be primarily defensive and cautionary, but this core logic
can often backfire and act as a justification for individuals to overstep the mark and react
impulsively and aggressively to perceived threats, in the process propagating what it seeks to
resist. In what follows we will attempt to explain how the embodied motivations of this visceral
habitus act at the centre of the subject’s biographical narrative.
Our general thesis is also connected in a metaphorical sense to the work of Walter Benjamin and
his Theses on the Philosophy of History (1 999a). In his Arcades Project, Benjamin (1999b)
proposes that history should be conceived as a ‘technique of awakening’ and his work
throughout the Theses suggests a desire to break free from the constraints of chronological
time. For Benjamin, history is a constellation that incorporates both past and present, and thus it
becomes a crucial means of grasping the actuality of the here and now. Benjamin saw a critical
re-reading of history as a means to ‘take control of a memory’ and drag oneself away from the
restraint of tradition and traditional historicism created by the victors of the perennial class
struggle. Revisiting the truth of an event thus becomes a crucial process in grasping the
essence of the now. In the following sections we will adopt something similar to this framework in
our investigation of the individual’s subjective memories of past humiliations, suggesting that
violent men often address unfolding social interaction as a means of taking control of painful
and humiliating memories, rewriting the past and rehabilitating the self from its previous
failures.
The thesis also draws upon the work of Freud (1975, 1995) and Lacan (2006; see also Žižek,
2006) and their readings of narcissism and ego. Freud suggested that narcissism is a
fundamental aspect of the human psyche, but one that is usually attenuated during
socialization as the individual enters the Symbolic Order. Here the super-ego becomes fully
developed as the individual internalizes the ethical, social and behavioural expectations of her
culture. Crucially, narcissism becomes pathogenic if the super-ego does not develop in a
form that can prohibit the Id and sublimate its energy in socially acceptable ways; in this
scenario narcissism is allowed to live on as the dominant psychodynamic force in the
individual’s life-course. The ego’s role is to mediate between the base drives of the Id and
everyday reality, guided by the guilt- inducing cultural protocols and moral judgements that
have been internalized by the super-ego. We also draw upon the concepts of the ego ideal
and ideal ego, which Freud used in a rather confusing, interchangeable manner (Strachey,
1962). Jacques Lacan (2006) later made a clear distinction between the two terms and their
forms and functions; ego ideal is essentially a socially sanctioned image of oneself to which the
maturing ego should aspire, while ideal ego (imago) is a more problematic form of identification
driven by the immature pre-symbolic self’s narcissistic identification with the image of a dominant
other and its mysterious desires, and the desire to establish the self immediately in that other’s
image (see Evans, 1996; Lacan, 2006; Hall et al., 2008). These basic concepts of habitus,
control of memory and destiny, and narcissistic identification underpin our argument in ways
that hopefully will become clear.
CONSUMER CULTURE AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Before we take a close look at the words of our respondents in order to shed some light on the
meanings and justifications proffered by those men who regularly encounter violence and
imbue it with crucial importance in their identity formation, we need to take a brief look at the
roles of memory, humiliation and regret in contemporary culture. Throughout the analysis of our
data it was quite striking how the ‘dark memories’ that often accompany violent incidents
seemed to represent missed opportunities that weigh heavily on the individual psyche.
Biography and identity have been transformed from a given into a task (Bauman, 2001), and
moreover an often difficult task in which the blame for any failures must be placed firmly at the
door of the individual (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001). The acceptance of personal
responsibility for our own missed opportunities seems to be an increasingly important aspect
of how we make sense of the intricate emotions that constitute habitus and identity. This
constitutive process now takes place in the context of consumer culture. The inescapable mass-
mediated spectacle of consumer capitalism and its attendant cultures now appear to be
cultivating types of introspection, guilt and self-doubt which have never before been such active
constituents of human experience. As Žižek (2000, 2002) and Hall et al. (2008) have claimed,
the economic imperative to constantly expand the consumption of symbolically loaded goods
that drives consumer culture has diminished prohibitions on enjoyment and the gratification of
hedonistic desires. This major cultural shift has reconfigured the way we experience the guilt
directed at us by the ferocious superego; we are no longer quite so guilty about gratifying
ourselves, but far guiltier about missing opportunities to do so. In high-modern western
societies the fundamental force of the super-ego acted to regulate subjective action and
expression in social life by ensuring that the well-adjusted individual experienced a measure
of guilt if they failed to be civilized and sociable. Now, in a hyper-modern era where symbolism,
desire and jouissance (the urge to take pleasure beyond its boundaries into a realm where it
becomes painful) have been conflated, we are more likely to feel guilty when we fail to take
advantage of the opportunities for the hedonistic delights that abound in contemporary
consumer culture.
It is in this climate of reconfigured guilt that we trawl through our archives of emotional
images that dominate our memories of the way we dealt with important ‘social events’ in
times past, a practice that tends to recall and emphasize ‘missed opportunities’; forks in the
road at which, we might reflect, a wrong turn was made, or at which we failed to act upon an
invitation or opportunity that might have nudged our lives in a radically different direction.
One of the key psychological outcomes of this process is regret; regret at what might have been,
how one’s life might have been different, in some way ‘better’, free from the travails that blight
the pressing actuality of the present (Landman, 1993). Issues surrounding the event may be
continually replayed, sifted and sorted by the individual, influencing powerfully the individual’s
perception of everyday life and her place in the social order. The discursive tools we have at our
disposal to fashion some meaningful understanding of biographical progress, the politics of
‘personal growth’, and indeed our own intrinsic personal worth, are now inextricably linked to the
acquisitive and ornamental nature of consumer culture.
Here we can see what might well be a connection between Bourdieu’s habitus, Lacan’s
narcissistic imaginary and symbolic ideals (the pre-symbolic ideal egos or imagos and post-
symbolic ego ideals) and Benjamin’s urge to rewrite the past by exorcising humiliating
memories of our failure to act at crucial points in our biography. Some individuals forge and
reproduce their habitus in a cultural microclimate where intimidation, aggression and petty
violence are common. As the classical industrial- capitalist era of institutionalized social conflict
has given way to atomized late modern forms of interpersonal violence and delinquency
(Wieviorka, 2009), the visceral habitus (Hall, 1997) has become the main guide for the actor’s
struggle for symbolic and cultural capital in localized social fields. The guilt imposed on the subject
by a reoriented superego fixated on missed opportunities propels the individual in his struggle to
acquire symbols that represent this imaginary ‘capital’. At the same time the new super-ego
has difficulty in denying the nagging attraction of the narcissistic ideal ego that has slipped
through the net of symbolic prohibitions in what appears to be an increasingly permissive yet
insecure and competitive consumer culture and partially merged with the ego ideal, the position
of judgement occupied by socially and functionally competent figures of admiration (Žižek,
2000; Hall et al., 2008). Guilt will therefore bear down on an individual who fails to appease
underlying feelings of insecurity by following the habitus’s guidance in the quest to acquire
cultural capital represented by competent others in localized environments where the
aggressive assertion and defence of the self is the norm. The failure to deal with violent
incidents in the past thus becomes lodged in the memory and the emotions as a humiliating
failure to act in accordance with the guidance of habitus and the desire to construct the self in
the image of the idealized, competent and distinguished other who represents the effortless
acquisition and display of localized forms of cultural and symbolic capital. Dealing with the
aggression of the other in a specific encounter is experienced as a social ‘quilting point’ and
therefore a crossroads to entirely different futures on the road to the acquisition of cultural
capital. Backing away from physical conflict can generate intense feelings of humiliation and
regret, which in turn fuel the urge to seek – again guided by the reoriented superego in
partnership with the embodied visceral habitus – and take advantage of a point in the real
future where the reimagination of a more positive imaginary future can be legitimized by
the outcome of a real event. This basic process warrants more detailed exploration.
To cast one’s eye across the spectacle of contemporary consumer culture is to be struck by
the brutal excess of social competition, in which the individual’s performance is judged in
relation to consumerism’s system of status symbols. As the economic engine of advanced
capitalism runs on a fuel whose major constituent is inexhaustible consumer passions, and given
that whatever consumer symbols we have accumulated in the task of constructing and
maintaining our identities are destined to rapidly lose the appeal that prompted their initial
acquisition (Bauman, 2001), our emotional lives have become littered with alternative and
idealized versions of our individual biographies. For so many individuals today the material items
and vague status signifiers already acquired are deemed unimportant very shortly after their
purchase, forever ‘not good enough’. It is always that which has not yet been acquired, that
which remains tantalizingly just out of reach, which dominates the consumer identity.
Ruminating about alternative biographical trajectories thus produces a ready collection of small
and occasionally inconsequential interactions that, if they had been dealt with in the
retrospectively idealized ‘correct’ manner, could have produced a dream-like existence devoid
of all that engenders frustration in the present. Reflecting on other potential versions of our
lives accentuates the significance of key events, words or gestures that could have changed things:
a job interview we messed up, a business opportunity we let slide, a romantic relationship from
which we retreated. What continues to weigh heavily upon our minds is not simply the regret
that accompanies the fleeting missed opportunity, but constant reflection on the failure to
launch the self into a whole alternative future that might have followed the opportunity had it
been taken successfully; the actual non-existence of what might have been.
Our ego, guided by the reoriented super-ego injunction to enjoy, explores a variety of scripts in
which what actually occurred need be of no more significance than what actually might have
occurred. These thought processes are often marginalized as unimportant daydreams, mere
flights of fancy or figments of the imagination. What we are suggesting here is that the vivid
recollection of key events need not necessarily be dominated by the actuality of the events at all;
the negative emotions that accompany such recollections render the real memory at once
unappealing yet irreducible as a means of conceiving the essence of the self. As Freud
suggested, in order to truly forget something one must first summon up the courage to
remember it correctly. Yet truthfully recalling the actuality of painful and humiliating experiences
is often difficult. When we momentarily transport ourselves back to these key events, the painful
reality may lurk beneath a range of images, feelings, narratives and scenarios constructed to
transform the event into one that is less emotionally damaging, less humiliating, less
injurious. These thought processes might also convert ignominious defeat into heroic
triumph, or romantic rejection into moral victory. What we remember is not what actually
occurred, but what, at some level, we might like to have occurred. As our consciousness
attempts to process and deal with the consequences of the event, the actuality of what
transpired becomes dominated by a range of idealized images of what might have
happened. In other words we think not of how we actually responded to the event, but of
ways in which we might have responded, ways that would have prevented the emotional harm
caused by the event’s actuality. In everyday conversations many individuals recount what they
would have liked to have done or said in a difficult encounter rather than what they actually
did or said, and one can often get the impression that they are trying to fool themselves as well
as their interlocutors. However, in any localized culture dominated by a strong and insistent
visceral habitus, the individual will tend to select in the imagination specific alternative events and
reactions that reflect idealized, competent forms of masculine identity and performance, and in
these cultures the thought of what might have happened can easily become transposed into
the insistent normative command of what one should have really done at the t ime to make it
happen.
Our data tend to suggest that this process applies to the memory of a violent assault. The
desire of the psyche to address the trauma of the event is compelling and promotes significant
reflection, but the brutal actuality of the event itself tends to be insulated by a range of social,
cultural and psychological processes that protect the subject from revisiting directly and
truthfully the real trauma of the event. We thus produce a range of idealized scripts that
attempt to rehabilitate the event, to remove trauma and humiliation and replace them with
retrospectively idealized responses that would have prevented what actually occurred or
transformed its eventual outcome. In the same way that the narcissistic subject refuses to
enter the Symbolic Order and retains the ideal ego as the object of identification, the humiliated
subject refuses to enter an order of symbols that represent the ignominious reality of his past
failure. It is our contention that these idealized scripts, which are in effect a shadow of the
event itself, are not simply meaningless daydreams but an ongoing reflection of the psyche’s
indomitable desire to deal with the event itself, and the actual form these reflections take is
intimately connected to and guided by the embodied habitus of the subject as it works
alongside the reoriented super-ego’s injunction to never miss opportunities to establish the self
as its imago in the narcissistic identification process. This guided urge to revive the opportunity
in the present is very likely to propel the individual beyond the symbolic – in effect to by-pass the
symbolic order with its means of representing the real and coming to terms with past events –
to the realm of painful jouissance where the pleasure of aggressively rectifying the situation
might well become painful (in this case psychic pain combined with literal physical pain); but
this is always a risk worth taking, and in most cases barely considered.
THE TIME OF THE NOW
How does this psychosocial process drive the individual to a point where he acts out
his imaginary redemption? Benjamin (1999a) suggested a fundamental space–time
contradiction in which ‘social progress’ is rendered artificial and memories of alternative
narratives breach chronological time to be reawakened in ‘the time of the now’. Benjamin
famously noted that the revolutionary event offers the opportunity not just to address the
perceived inequities of the immediate social world, but remains tied to key historical events,
and is condemned to repeat or redeem the revolutionary failures of the past. As Žižek (2002)
suggests, we might expand this theme further; what we seek is not just the chance to address
the struggle for the suppressed past (Benjamin, 1999a), but also to confront directly the
inability to act, to seize the revolutionary moment in the intervening period. That which did
not occur does not necessarily disappear into complete non-existence, but remains forever
attached to the event as a crucial rejoinder, a contextual device that continually struggles for
existence and recognition. Therefore the immediate revolutionary act is freed from the constraints
of space–time, and it may repeat or redeem the failures of the past. Now that the institutionalized
collective conflict of the classical capitalist era has temporarily subsided (Bauman, 2001;
Wieviorka, 2009) the process operates only at the individual level and, crucially, it offers us the
direct opportunity to address the times when we did nothing, the times when we should have
acted but remained silent and immobile. This general framework, in which the failure to act
battles for recognition, can be usefully deployed as a means of understanding the ways in
which violent men criticize their own social engagement and how their inability to act ‘correctly’
in past events can shape social behaviour in the here and now.
Think of a key moment in your life, one that contained an element of humiliation, an event of
profound psychological importance to your sense of self. In all likelihood you have revisited
this event countless times, both consciously and subconsciously, in an attempt to address the
core problematic of the event itself. Occasionally, these visits back to the trauma of the event
may have been fully conscious, in which you actually revisit the painful reality of what actually
happened in detail. Others may have taken the form of impressionistic daydreams or flights of
fancy that may appear to have little to do with the event’s reality. It is our contention that this
process of revisiting the event often takes the form of a recollection of that which did not happen.
The brutal essence of the event may remain, but the interface between sub-consciousness
and cultural identity endeavours to conjure up a vivid assortment of idealised triumphs rather
than the actual ignominy of humiliation or defeat. When victims of violence or humiliation
think about these events, they do not always think about what really happened, the blows that
were struck or their inability to adequately defend themselves. The actual events are often too
painful to revisit directly, and, most importantly for our purposes here, the victims tend to resist
mature symbolization of the events, constructing instead idealized alternative scripts that in
some way reflect how they would have liked to have reacted in the midst of the event. Rather,
pre-symbolic and essentially narcissistic idealized images of their imaginary heroic reactions
are given shape, durability and social meaning by the struggle to acquire cultural and
symbolic capital, and become building block of the embodied habitus.
The barely conscious desire to revisit the event and the creation of alternative scripts that
remove the cultural and psychic harm caused by what actually occurred is often
supplemented by the ego ideal’s desire to construct an image of the self that in western
consumer culture reflects admiration for the aggressive, dominant other. Here the narcissistic
ideal ego is no longer opposed by the social ego ideal; rather the two merge (see Hall et al.,
2008); many of the interviews we conducted suggested a subconscious and indirect form of
mimetic admiration for the aggressively dominant and narcissistic other as ego ideal. The
dominant other now represents the self in the alternative triumphal narrative, a vengeful self
driven by amour-propre that can fi nd respite only in the downfall of others (Hall et al., 2008).
In these abstract recollections, the image of the dominant other stands in for the self and
enacts the idealized response to the event. In these recollections, therefore, the victims see
themselves in the image of the dominant other and it is this image that retrospectively
performs in the mythical shadow event. Our interviewees’ ruminations on past humiliations
could be rehabilitated only if the self became dominant and refused to back away from future
social or physical challenges. The completion of this process, where the subject actually enacts
domineering behaviours as a result of a retrospective critique of previous social conduct, allows
the psyche to address the actual trauma of the event by transforming it into a mere learning
process or staging post on the journey towards ultimate self-becoming.
For some of the men we interviewed, the image of the non-event – that is, the transformed
and idealized shadow of what actually occurred – stimulates the desire to imagine oneself as
the undefeatable, all-dominant hero striding manfully over challenging terrain. If this cannot
be achieved in the acceptable pacified ways of achieving power and status, then violence
becomes a likely option, especially if the visceral habitus is carrying this tendency as a
vestigial form of practice in the struggle for cultural and symbolic capital. Sublimated and
restrained alternatives routes to domination do exist – demonstrated by those who are
inclined towards the role of the ‘reluctant hero’ (Slotkin, 2000) who battles gallantly against
insurmountable odds or the ‘intelligent other’, the ‘Odyssean trickster’ (see Adorno and
Horkheimer, 1992) who can confuse and defeat the guileless barbarian with reason,
intelligence, verbal dexterity or comedic put-downs – but the identification and struggle remain
the same. Our central suggestion here is that these emotionally charged images feed back into
the very nature of identity and can become a crucial context for future social behaviour. The
image of what didn’t happen continually battles for recognition, infi ltrates the victim’s core
identity and exerts its subtle influence upon unfolding social engagement.
TALK ABOUT HUMILIATION
The quotes below are examples of how young men who have experienced the emotional
trauma caused by humiliation and violent defeat experience this process of reflection and
negotiation. The interviews themselves were often highly charged as our respondents revisited
traumatic events of the past and attempted to convey to the interviewer how these events have
affected their social behaviour and social identities. Indeed it’s also worth noting that a small
number of our respondents revealed that they took to striking inanimate objects as a result of
powerful recollections of ignominious defeat and the idealized scripts that accompany these
recollections. For these men, directing one’s aggression at inanimate objects appears to be a
result not simply of feelings of anger or injustice, but also of a retrospective dissatisfaction
with their performance in the event and the terrifying prospect of a bleak future of
acquiescence and cultural irrelevance. We might speculate that this punching of walls,
windows and doors is not just about transference, whereby the wall substitutes for the foe and
the blow struck stands in for the blow that should have been thrown in the actual event
itself. It’s also quite likely that this seemingly irrational activity may also act as a self-
administered punishment and critique in which the blow, the object struck and the resulting
physical pain address the subjective inability to act in the retrospectively idealized way,
demonstrating again a process by which the original humiliation cannot fade away but
reproduces itself and demands cathexis.
Michael, a key respondent in our earlier ethnographic study (Win low, 2001), was interviewed on
many occasions throughout 1998 and 1999. Michael was and is a committed professional
criminal who has experienced a degree of financial success as a result of his involvement in
local criminal markets. His place in the local criminal hierarchy is grounded in his ability to be
successfully violent and to constantly promote his aura of physical threat. Michael is happy to
admit that he has not triumphed in every physical fight in which he has been involved, but as he
tells us, ‘winning’ isn’t always the point. Here Michael has been asked why it is impossible for
him to walk away from a verbal challenge:
I couldn’t . . . I ’d just stew on it . . . just go over and over, just stew on it . There’s th ings
can’ t be al lowed to happen, otherwise you just stew on i t . Can’ t ge t i t ou t your head . . .
Maybe i t gets worse , the more you th ink about i t , i t gets worse . . . I f it happens [you let a
verbal challenge pass], i t can happen over and over. Then, what’s left [of masculine
identity?]?
Michael is making a basic but highly insightful observation about the nature of masculine
identity for those who inhabit this particular cultural milieu. He appears to be making a
direct reference to the emotional disturbance caused not simply by defeat in a violent conflict,
but also by allowing subsequent perceived slights to go unpunished. Michael believes his
immediate social world to be inhabited by nakedly instrumental others attempting to wrestle
dignity from each other. Without due vigilance, his social position and self-identity will be
challenged, found to be lacking, and eventually destroyed. Michael talks of being unable to
get perceived challenges ‘out of his head’, and here he uses an interesting word to describe his
emotional temperament; he will ‘stew’ over it, which implies that his rumination on the
incident will simmer away gradually, requiring no immediate or continual action but requiring
eventual resolution if even more powerful threats and injuries to his self identity are to be
avoided. The idea of ‘having nothing left’ if one allows the instrumental other to ignore the
cultural protocols associated with respect and dignity while aggressively dominating every-
day interactions was a common theme across both samples. This is not an attempt to be
dominant but an attempt to prevent others from becoming dominant, to retain dignity and
protect the self from painful humiliation and rumination by being ready to fight and trump
aggression with actual violence. This is a key component in Michael’s culturally informed self-
image. From his standpoint he cannot allow slights or insults to go unpunished. He appears to
be expressing the fear that if these components cannot be retained the ‘self’ in its present form
is lost.
Jimmy agreed to interview in 1999 and at that time was a reasonably successful professional
criminal. Again, he is responding to a succession of questions about the importance of being
violent:
I t ’s something everyone goes through coz it ’s a learning exper ience isn’t i t? . . . Even tua l ly
you learn i t ’ s no t wor th i t , you ’ve go t to sor t i t ou t . And i t changes th ings . . . No, you just
get, you know, ‘fuck it ’ [he means get to a stage where he can excla im, ‘ fuck i t ! Let the
chips fa l l where they may’ ] ! Because you don’ t want to get in to the situat ion where people
are gett ing on top of you, so next t ime you know you can’ t stand back . . . Yeah, i t goes
around in your head a bi t . Then next t ime you’re ready.
All our respondents seemed to be experiencing emotionally driven psychosocial processes that
are far more complex than peer-group pressure or an injunction to follow the scripts that
guide the ‘doing’ of some suppositious ‘hegemonic masculinity’. In mainstream western culture
it is not the guilelessly violent male but the reliably pacified individual – expert in the practices
of patient, sublimated aggression and competition – who is successful and therefore more
representative of the prevailing hegemony (see Hall, 2002). Here Jimmy is ready for the next
challenge that must ultimately come his way, not simply because he has applied negative
sentiments to previous challenges from which, with much regret, he has backed away or in
which he has been defeated, but because ‘it has gone around in [his] head’, and because he has
worked through a variegated assortment of alternative scripts in his imagination which allow him
to emerge victorious by responding ‘correctly’ to the perceived challenge. Jimmy’s words
appear to be more than mere bravado. Our ethnographic observations of Jimmy at work and
play indicated clearly his willingness to use violence when he sensed threat. Indeed, in a
way that on the surface appears paranoid, he would often search conversation for signs of a
challenge or slight to which he can respond aggressively. For example, he would often say, ‘what
do you mean by that?’ or offer an entirely unreasonable summation of the speech of others, for
example ‘are you trying to say I’m fucking stupid?’. It seemed as if this overt aggressivity is
geared towards cultivating fear in others, but it is also drawn out by his firmly held belief that
many of those he encounters are trying to get one over on him in some way, and if he doesn’t
aggressively defend himself and his interests his self-respect will be demolished, his reputation
tarnished and his position in the criminal marketplace usurped. In this environment these
thoughts are not paranoid but reasonably accurate assessments of the situation and its
hypothetical outcomes.
For Jimmy, backing down from a challenge ‘isn’t worth it’, even if one avoids significant
physical injury, because, to him, the intense discomfort of humiliation and constant guilt-driven
rumination about idealized alternative responses, and the risk of intensifying them further, are
much more burdensome. Once again, allowing ‘people to get on top of you’ means discarding a
key component of one’s identity. The key part of this quote is the sentence, ‘so next time you
know you can’t stand back’. Jimmy appears to be addressing directly the relationship between
the imaginary non-event and his present social engagement. Having experienced humiliating
events and the psychic disturbance that accompanies them, in order to cathect the energy
generated he has resolved to make real the mythical non-event the next time he encounters
a verbal or physical challenge. As he tells us, the ‘next time you’re ready’; ready not to back
away, but to make real the mythical response to the challenge as faithfully as possible.
Although the ideal of the self as the dominant, aggressive other is indeed a fantasy, it fuels a
real struggle for ‘capital’ in the variations found in this class-based and historically continuous
cultural milieu. Jimmy intends to actually enact the script of the non-event, that is, the product
of the psychological rumination that inevitably accompanies the initial event itself; thus the
reproductive habitus is reinforced and the past is linked inextricably to the present and the
future.
The trauma of the actual event has caused Jimmy to revisit idealized versions of the encounter
persistently until it becomes clear that future events of this type can be met only with at best
domineering verbal abuse or at worst actual violent aggression if he is to avoid further
emotional discomfort. Because he is firmly incorporated in his cultural milieu, where ‘backing
down’ promotes visions of a bleak future after the event, the alternative strategy of
constructing the ideal of a permanent victory by imagining himself to be ‘above’ this
‘uncivilized’ interaction is unavailable to him. Physical harm becomes marginalized as an issue
because Jimmy regards passivity as potentially far more injurious, and he often responds
aggressively to words or behaviours that suggest the first inkling of potential trouble. The
person who utters such words, or the audience that witnesses this kind of aggressive
eruption, may then judge Jimmy to be wild, unnecessarily aggressive or violent beyond
reason. This reading of the social encounter is thus a reflection of their inability to decode what
is occurring in the same way as Jimmy because they are denied any direct insight into Jimmy’s
subjective interpretation. In the vast majority of cases the incident is understood from afar as
the pathological individual fixated on an atavistic version of ‘male honour’, disrupting what
would be without the presence of himself and other like him the civilized cultures of late
modernity; indeed, perhaps rather surprisingly, this rudimentary and superficial notion is still put
forward as a total explanation for violence (e.g. Spierenburg, 2008). However, as we have seen, it
is far more complex than that. From Jimmy’s standpoint, unequivocal and immediate aggression is
entirely rational and a necessary therapeutic and self-rescuing response if he is to achieve some
respite from the constant emotional disturbance caused by retrospective assessments of his own
failure and passivity, which are reinforced by the broader contextual forms of socio-economic
failure and political passivity that accompany his current position in the world.
What Jimmy is alluding to is a standard axiom of this particular habitus, one which was voiced
by a number of our respondents in both samples; if one is to have any hope of respect and
psychosocial survival upon this marginalized and often violent cultural terrain, if one is to have
any hope of emerging triumphant from a physical conflict, then one should retaliate first, or run
the risk that the new event will become a time-portal through which the humiliating historical
tragedy will repeat itself. This particular adage is drawn from deep experience and highly
nuanced knowledge of an external world in which the possibilities of physical danger and
emotional humiliation constantly haunt social experience. To be in any way reticent about
physical conflict invites others to dominate in a way that destroys rather than affirms the
narcissistic desire to see the self reflected in this merged ideal ego and ego ideal, and
consequently the victim must always allow the visceral habitus to act automatically once a sense
of danger is detected and enters the consciousness.
Here, the first blow of the conflict is struck metaphorically; a direct or indirect challenge is
issued, or, crucially, is at least perceived to have been issued. In the phenomenological sense the
retaliatory blow is actually the first physical blow struck, and, for combatants operating outside
archaic codes of chivalry, it is usually the decisive blow (see Hobbs, 1995; Winlow, 2001). It
is also important to understand that the physical retaliatory blow need not be thrown in the
immediacy of the moment. As many of our respondents suggested, the perception of a
challenge might engender significant reflection, rumination and symbolic mutation. The
significance of what has been said slips and slides until the words are unequivocally understood
as a threat or challenge. This process might take some time, and the failure to respond
adequately in the immediacy of the moment augments and intensifies the burden of regret
and self-criticism as the initial event and its shadows command the attention of the psyche;
retaliation might be postponed, but it isn’t abandoned, and the temporary desistance actually
carves out a space for further rumination. There is no doubt that the presence of an audience
of peers can put further pressure on the individual to perform, but we must stress that for
those whose habitus carries this emotional drive and practical logic, and whose super-ego is
fixated on the missed opportunity, it is by no means a vital precondition.
As some of our respondents emphasized, the actual physical conflict itself might occur some
time after the perceived challenge, but during the intervening period, anger does not
dissipate and can intensify quite significantly. These delays can often persuade audiences to
interpret these disputes as acts of random violence. Jimmy or Michael, or someone else, might
suddenly assault a man in a bar or on the street. These supposed random acts of unwarranted
aggression are often highly prized in criminal cultures and can bestow a degree of esteem and
status, but in most cases they are not at all random or poorly thought out. In some cases they
may be the result of a previous incident that one participant judged unproblematic and the
other has brooded over before eventually reading the event as a challenge, a threat or a
slight, demanding a postponed assault understood as an actual continuation of the initial
event. They have brooded over what might be tiny aspects of interaction, eventually identified
as threats or challenges, and decided that their sense of self will not and cannot absorb the
perceived humiliation of passivity or withdrawal. Other supposedly random acts of violence
might also be the result of one participant’s desire to enact idealized versions of a humiliating
event, even if the other participant knows little or nothing about it. Their social experience
has told them that this type of symbolic defeat can never be easily absorbed by the ego. Unless
they act, they will suffer the ceaseless frustration of what might have been.
Thus the stereotype of the violent Other waiting for some form of social interaction that can
then be construed as a challenge or slight, which therefore requires immediate violent
resolution, actually resonates in some cultural fields, but not in the straightforward manner we
often presume. As Freud (1975) noted, this ‘compulsion to repeat’, proposed by Lacan (2006)
as that which drives the subject to the painful realm of jouissance beyond meaning and
signification and is therefore not amenable to language and rationality, can give the appearance
of some ‘daemonic force at work’. For some men violence becomes a visceral theatre in which
they can subconsciously seek to resolve complex biographical issues and attempt to enact a
culturally framed version of the mainstream’s fantasised ego ideal merged with the individual’s
narcissistic ideal ego. Jimmy and Michael continually find themselves in violent situations not
because of bad luck, and not simply as a basic reflection of the environments in which they
move; to them violence is emotionally charged, compelling, an aspect of social action that
‘makes sense’ and offers them the opportunity to do the kind of ‘identity work’ that reflects the
cultural concerns of the visceral habitus. He who places violence and domination close to the
centre of self-identity can often appear uncontrolled and highly volatile; recognized features
of men who carry violent repute with them in criminal cultures (Hobbs, 1995).
Paul was interviewed in 2005 for our recent book, Violent Night (Winlow and Hall, 2006).
Although he is young and ‘working class’, Paul has no experience of the pressures of
active involvement in criminal cultures and occupies a cultural landscape far more pacified
than that occupied by Michael and Jimmy. Here Paul is recalling the psychological processes
involved in dealing with a recent violent incident in which he was seriously assaulted by
unknown assailants while out drinking in the city centre:
I suppose I was a bit upset, a bit angry . . . just going over it and over it and making it worse
. . . I did go over it a lot. I stil l do really. Now, talking about it, just makes me wish I ’d , you
know, whacked the bastard, just tore into h im, and the more I went over i t the more I
dec ided I wasn ’ t go ing to get caught l i ke that aga in . . . I th ink I p robab ly jus t s ta r t ing to
th ink about i t more and more . I went to the gym a lo t more and just changed a bi t real ly
overa l l . . . I t might have just been me growing up but I think my mood changed a bi t . . . I
just k ind of thought I wouldn’ t let that happen again.
In a similar vein to both Michael and Jimmy, Paul is suggesting that the incident itself has been
the cause of significant rumination. Once again, he has concluded that his response to the
incident was wholly inadequate, and he has produced a range of idealized responses that,
had they been enacted, would have allowed him to escape the humiliation of ignominious
defeat. In the idealized shadow of the event, he stands firm instead of running away, fights back
instead of rolling into a ball, battles heroically against insurmountable odds in order to emerge
battered and bruised but otherwise victorious. He now appears resolute in his desire never to
allow such events to transpire again. For many men of working-class origin, the correct response is
not simply about achieving triumph, but rather gallantly taking on the challenge in the
expected way. During childhood and adolescence they are subject to both subtle and
transparent forms of cultural socialization that stress the importance of fortitude, endurance and
steadfastness. Ideally, if defeat must come it should be embraced courageously; the
psychological wellbeing and the maintenance of dignity and selfhood ensured by this ‘correct
response’ are far more important than experiencing actual physical defeat. Responding to
threats in ways idealized by the embodied habitus thus enables the individual to shuffle a little
closer to the sense of self that signifies the ceaseless desire of the disturbed psyche to find
tranquillity (see Damasio, 2003).
Tellingly, the imaginary revisiting and reworking of the assault have had a clear impact upon his
social behaviour in the here and now. The dark shadow of his ignominious defeat has
produced a range of idealized responses that dominate his thoughts, so much so that he
now tentatively seeks out challenges to which he may respond in the correct manner. His
life up until this point is clearly indicative of the successful pacification of his basic biological
and psychological drives, but the sudden arrival of violence into his life, and the emotional
processes that accompany it, have prompted him to reappraise his idea of the essence of
himself. Violence appears no longer to be buried beneath a broad array of socio-cultural
prohibitions and psychological strategies of containment, and is now a social and behavioural
option which he is now willing to utilize immediately as an internal and external expression of
selfhood:
Paul : One time we were in this bar and my mate got into a fight. I t was over something that
had been go ing on ages since we were kids and they ’d had a f igh t before and we a l l k ind
of knew each other . He was get t ing the bet ter of my mate so I just whacked him really.
Q : W h y ?
Paul: Just happened . . . I just saw him there and then I hit him . . . I suppose I just felt angry,
just angry and then h i t h im . . . I don’ t th ink I fe l t good but I d idn’ t fee l bad . . . [ I think]
maybe people might have thought about me a bit dif ferent, and that was kind of good.
While Paul has yet to earn the hard-won street credentials of Michael and Jimmy, our data
appear to suggest that he might have followed their tendency to seek out a potentially
violent situation, hitherto judged to be unpleasant, in order to invoke a sense of control over
the event. Paul has attempted to reproduce a social situation in which he may face his dark
memory of passive victimhood and achieve redemption and peace. This new reality thus provides
him with the opportunity to paint over his previous image of himself in vivid, heroic tones. Now
he is no longer the humiliated victim of domination and control. Paul also indicates that this is
not purely an internal process; he is keenly aware that an image of himself in his external
cultural habitat can be modified by engaging in such visible acts. However, this is rooted in
something far deeper than hegemonic pressure transmitted by a peer group; passivity risks
contravening the primal and enduring anthropological principle of symbolic exchange; he who
cannot appropriately exchange an act ceases to exist in the eyes of self and others (see Bourdieu,
1992; Baudrillard, 1993, 2007). He presumes that his undefined external audience has
previously understood him as passive, even emasculated, and this new test and the displacement
of a former self has enabled him to express and exchange positively his social identity. However,
as we have already suggested, the existence of an audience on the spot is important but not
vitally necessary; the judgements of others, which can be indicated simply by the inability to see
the self reflected in an unresponsive ideal ego, have already been internalized in the prolonged
narcissistic identification process.
Ray proved to be one of our key research contacts in the 2004–5 cohort. Unlike Michael or
Jimmy, Ray has no involvement in professional crime. Indeed, when we interviewed him he
was working short-term contracts in the building industry. Ray has, however, been socialized
and sees the world in a very similar way to Michael and Jimmy, and actually grew up on the same
estate as Michael. Ray has achieved a small but entirely justified reputation for violence within
his immediate social environment but is not feared in the same way as Michael or Jimmy. He
suggests,
‘I mean, I know if something happened I couldn’t just walk off and leave it because I’d just feel
like a complete waste of space, just some fucking idiot. I’d probably go to jail rather than let
someone take the piss’.
What Ray appears to be suggesting here is that his self-image could not cope with the
realization that he retreated from a direct or indirect challenge. Those who do retreat are,
from his point of view, ‘a complete waste of space, [a] fucking idiot’, not simply because they
have failed to live up to the idealized standards of intimidating masculinity in these cultures, but
more importantly because they have failed to recognize that the real defeat is suffered in
retrospect, as one is forced to constantly revisit the event and judge one’s performance
negatively. To Ray, it is foolish and irrational to suffer this prolonged pain, to allow oneself to be
propelled into the realm of jouissance without acting to break the repetitive cycle (Lacan, 2006).
We talked about violence at length with Ray and he appeared particularly keen to impress upon
us that physical harm isn’t particularly important. He positioned himself as a virtual violence
evangelist, he who had ‘seen the light’, and now knew that it was better to have fought
valiantly or responded acceptably to threats, even if he was badly beaten for his troubles. Cuts
and bruises and broken bones would heal, but the emotional trauma that accompanies perceived
cowardice, passivity and inability to exchange would not easily subside. Here Tim, another non-
criminal respondent in our 2005 study, makes a similar point:
The type of lad I am is just, I’m not the type who’s going to stand there and take shit f rom
anyone rea l ly . I ’m not the hardest b loke in the wor ld , bu t i t ’ s just automat ic if someone
has a go at me. There’s loads of people around here who could batter me, but I ’m not
bothered by i t . I ’ve had kickings before, i t doesn’ t bother me. I ’m not bothered by i t . I ’d
rather stand and get a kicking than run of f , because that ’s just not me.
Tim is clearly not in a position to challenge directly someone like Michael or Jimmy, but he
has found a degree of comfort in occupying the position of ‘he who will not retreat’. This
position allows him to retain a degree of dignity in a cultural environment populated by aggressive
and occasionally highly skilled potential combatants. Tim has and will face the horror of violent
defeat so that he can retain some sense of dignity and respect within his immediate cultural
environment. He may not be one of the dominant local gladiators, but Tim can retain a
culturally informed sense of masculine identity with the knowledge that even they know that he
is willing to ‘stand up for himself’, no matter what the costs. However, of all of our
respondents, it is perhaps Al, another non-criminal respondent from the 2004–5 cohort, who
comes closest to vocalizing our core point:
People test you al l the t ime and they’ l l see how far they can push, pushing and pushing
unt i l you ei ther th ink, that ’s i t I ’ve had enough [and launch an attack] , or you pussy out and
walk off. But that’s not me and it’s not really any of the lads I call mates. What kind of man are
you if you let people push you about? I’ve seen people bott le [meaning ‘chicken out of ’]
trouble loads of t imes and it makes you think, how do they l ive with i t? Don’ t they
understand? . . . They might get out of a beat ing, but really, what would you think of
yourself if you let people just steamroller all over you? I t ’s just got to boi l your p iss hasn’ t
i t? Me it would just send me around the bend. I ’d be ohhh! arghh! Jus t go ing over i t and
over i t because I cou ldn ’ t ge t i t out my head. And when you get like that, it just gets worse
and worse until you do something about i t . At least wi th me anyway . . . I ’m not the type of
lad who could do that , walk away and then forget i t . I ’d be th ink ing, peop le th ink I ’m a
fuck ing id iot, don’ t they? Like you become a joke, people taking the piss and that, and I
couldn’ t l ive with i t , i t would prey on my mind.
CONCLUSION
Our basic thesis here is essentially a psychological extension of sociological theories of
violence that address the social, cultural and economic context of marginalized masculine
identities. What we have suggested here is a potential springboard for further sociological
analysis that takes psychological processes seriously. Theorized in this way our data suggest
that what appear to be random acts of violence are often deeply subjective responses to the
complexities of identity construction structured and motivated by the transformed super-ego and
marginalized habitus, and that memories of key events are often accompanied by an idealized
shadow event that can impact powerfully upon future social interaction.
The lives of our respondents are no longer bound by the institutions, codes and rituals of
traditional working-class male cultures which often provided collective and socially configured
‘opportunities to act’ in situations of far broader social conflict, thus negating the elite’s
symbolic violence and addressing the humiliation that eats away at the psyche. Most of these
codes, rituals and institutionalized and politicized forms of conflict – from durable territorial
gangs to assertive trade unions – have now all but evaporated, and the elite’s relentless
symbolic violence has erased the language and practices that once explained the sources and
structured the responses to subordination and humiliation (Bourdieu, 1986; Hall, 1997;
Wieviorka, 2009). Now the isolated individual is condemned to sense conflict as an individual
problem and ‘stew’ it internally. For our respondents, the controlled release of repressed
humiliation allowed by cultural sublimation and structured, institutionalised conflict appears almost
impossible as bottled-up impotent rage bubbles to the surface in acts of individual violence.
The absence of the codes, rituals and institutions that symbolized and dealt with conf lict
suggests that hostility and violence need not be directed solely at the original perpetrator or
his group; thus it can be random, diffuse and unpredictable, feeding back into the general
sense of fear and trepidation that often grips these marginalized neighbourhoods. Here it
makes sense for some young men to invest heavily in violence and intimidation; here it makes
sense to diligently cultivate an image of dominance, destructiveness and unfocused aggression;
and here it makes sense to retaliate first.
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